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FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS AND 
COPYRIGHT ACCOMMODATIONS 
David S. Olson* 
Abstract: Copyright law exists to encourage the creation of works of au-
thorship by granting exclusive rights. But copyright’s incentive function 
seems in tension with the public’s First Amendment interests to use and 
freely hear copyrighted speech. Conventional wisdom holds, however, 
that copyright law serves to encourage much more speech than it dis-
courages, and resolves First Amendment concerns with protections in-
ternal to copyright law like the fair use defense and the idea/expression 
dichotomy. This Article argues that the conventional wisdom no longer 
holds given the unprecedented expansion of copyright’s scope and cor-
responding drastic diminution of the public domain in the last three 
decades. This Article extends the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in El-
dred v. Ashcroft, which rejected the notion that courts should never sub-
ject copyright laws to First Amendment analysis, to read First Amend-
ment accommodations into copyright laws where use of copyrighted 
materials implicates significant speech interests. 
Introduction 
 American legal scholars have discussed the interaction of the First 
Amendment and copyright for quite some time.1 A number of articles 
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Law School Center for Internet and Society and the Fair Use Project. Specifically, I thank 
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1 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the 
Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First 
Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 1169 (2007) (collecting numerous 
sources); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970); 
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have been written on the potential conflicts between the two areas of 
law, and about how copyright law has been shaped and adapted by 
courts to accommodate First Amendment interests.2 Some courts and 
commentators have argued that copyright law is now structured in such 
a way that it can deal internally with all First Amendment interests, and 
thus scrutiny of a copyright law using the First Amendment is never ap-
propriate.3 Others have argued that although copyright law has some 
built-in protections of speech, the First Amendment should neverthe-
less be applied directly in certain copyright cases.4 
                                                                                                                      
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970). 
2See supra note 1; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
(establishing that parody is covered by fair use); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original ex-
pression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed 
by a work. This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, 
applies to all works of authorship.”) (internal citation omitted); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 
432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The fair-use doctrine was initially developed by courts as an eq-
uitable defense to copyright infringement. In effect, the doctrine creates a limited privi-
lege in those other than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a rea-
sonable manner without the owner’s consent.”); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 
1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (“The case law embodying the idea/expression dichotomy, 
which traces its roots back to Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), holds that copyright pro-
tection extends only to the expression of a particular idea, not the idea itself. The doctrine 
is grounded both in a presumed legislative intent to grant an author a monopoly only in 
his expressions—not his ideas—and in the First Amendment interest in the free exchange 
of ideas.”). 
3 Some cases have implied, or even said directly, that copyright law incorporates all 
needed First Amendment protections internally. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Henson, 
No. CV-96-20271-RMW (EAI), 1999 WL 362837, *1 (9th Cir. June 4, 1999) (holding that 
the First Amendment “argument fails in light of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), in which the [Supreme] Court stated that the laws of the 
Copyright Act already embrace First Amendment concerns”); A&M Records, Inc. v. Nap-
ster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. 
Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999)) (holding First Amendment inter-
ests “are protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine”); L.A. Times v. Free Re-
public, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1472 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that First Amendment interests 
“are subsumed within the fair use [a]nalysis”). 
4 See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 1, at 1173–74; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright 
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 37–46 (2001); Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, 
the First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 673, 695 (2003) ( “El-
dred signals an end to the practice of ignoring the First Amendment in copyright, and . . . 
proper recognition of the First Amendment improves judicial evaluation of aggressive 
copyright claims”); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Construction of Third 
Party Copyright Liability, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1481, 1584 (arguing that First Amendment con-
cerns militate for limits on presumed damages arising from copyright claims for third-
party liability); W. Warren Hamel, Note, Harper & Row v. The Nation: A First Amendment 
Privilege for News Reporting of Copyrightable Material?, 19 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 253, 290–
91 (1985). 
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 In the 2003 case, Eldred v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that generally copyright law does accommodate First Amendment in-
terests in such a way that direct First Amendment scrutiny is not 
needed.5 But the Court also said that those who believe that a copyright 
law need never be scrutinized under the First Amendment are wrong.6 
The Court held that where a copyright law hews to the “traditional con-
tours of copyright,” no First Amendment scrutiny is needed.7 The logi-
cal corollary, therefore, is that if a copyright law does not fall within the 
traditional contours of copyright, it should not be spared from First 
Amendment scrutiny, where such scrutiny would be appropriate under 
normal First Amendment law. 
 This approach by the Court recognizes that speakers have an in-
terest in making use of and building on the work of others.8 It also 
comports with judicial recognition that it is not just the speaker’s inter-
est that is protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has 
emphasized in a number of cases that the First Amendment also pro-
tects a community right to hear.9 This community right to hear is pro-
tected in cases of both political and artistic expression, regardless of 
whether the speaker’s motive is economic.10 
 There is inherent tension between the First Amendment’s com-
munity right to hear and copyright law, which gives the speaker the ex-
clusive right to distribute her speech on terms that she deems accept-
able, or not to distribute her speech at all.11 Courts and commentators 
have traditionally argued that the tension exists more in theory than in 
practice because, although copyright does give exclusive rights to au-
thors, these rights incentivize authors to produce many more works 
than would be produced absent the copyright regime.12 Thus, the ar-
                                                                                                                      
5 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003). 
6 Id. at 221. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 205–08. 
9 See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 989 n.29 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94–95 
(1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 
(1965); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 
359, 369 (1931)). 
10 See id. at 989 & nn.30–31. 
11 See id. at 991, 995. 
12 See, e.g., Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of 
Means, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 289, 325 (1999) (“[I]ntellectual property, and in particular 
copyright, is characterized by the fact that one of its purposes is to encourage freedom of 
speech and democratic values. Intellectual property restricts certain aspects of freedom of 
speech in order to promote freedom of speech in general.”) (internal citation omitted); 
Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at War with Itself, 35 
Hofstra L. Rev. 1211, 1234 (2007) (“Courts view copyright as a specialized economic 
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gument goes, copyright law, on net, greatly encourages the production 
of speech.13 And this additional production of speech is thought to 
adequately counterbalance the individual restrictions on speech that 
copyright owners impose by charging for copies of their works, or even 
withholding their works.14 
 But the amount of speech restricted by copyright as compared to 
the amount of speech copyright encourages has changed dramatically 
in the last three decades. Historically in the United States, most eligible 
works were never copyrighted, and of those works that were copy-
righted, the vast majority were out of copyright within twenty-eight 
years.15 Changes to copyright law in the last three decades have altered 
this landscape enormously.16 Now, due to the elimination of registra-
tion requirements and formalities, every eligible work is automatically 
protected for the life of the author plus seventy years (or ninety-five 
years for works made for hire and anonymous works).17 This has drasti-
cally increased the restriction on the ability to transmit, comment 
upon, and reuse speech, while providing a negligible additional incen-
tive to produce speech.18 
 Thus the ratio between the amount of speech encouraged by cop-
yright as compared to the amount burdened by copyright has shifted 
decisively towards greater speech restriction. So, whereas the traditional 
justification for not applying First Amendment law to copyright cases 
was that copyright gave us much more speech than it restricted, the 
                                                                                                                      
regulation consistent with the conventional view that copyright exists to provide incentives 
for creation. Accordingly, litigants can easily characterize highly protective copyright law as 
a reasonable attempt to structure the market for expressive works to ensure optimal levels 
of expressive contribution.”); Adrian Liu, Copyright as Quasi-Public Property: Reinterpreting the 
Conflict Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. 
L.J. 383, 387 (2008) (“Copyright’s speech-limiting effects are justified by the broader and 
ultimately speech-enhancing purpose of encouraging the creation of copyrighted works.”). 
13 See, e.g., Bendor, supra note 12, at 325; Goodman, supra note 12, at 1234; Liu, supra 
note 12, at 387. 
14 See, e.g., Bendor, supra note 12, at 325; Goodman, supra note 12, at 1234; Liu, supra 
note 12, at 387. 
15 See Netanel, supra note 4, at 23. 
16 See id. at 23–24. 
17 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
18 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 255–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the CTEA creates a 
copyright term worth 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright); see also Lawrence Les-
sig, Free Culture 232 (2004) (“The economists, as the list of Nobel winners demon-
strates, spanned the political spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no 
plausible claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do anything to in-
crease incentives to create. Such extensions were nothing more than ‘rent-seeking’ —the 
fancy term economists use to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.”). 
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much-greater current restrictions on speech from copyright should 
now serve to encourage the reevaluation of how well recent copyright 
law achieves First Amendment interests on its own. This Article argues 
that due to the drastic lock-up of speech from increased copyright cov-
erage, First Amendment scrutiny must be applied to copyright law with 
renewed vigor, and that in a number of areas, accommodations must be 
made in copyright law to protect First Amendment interests that are no 
longer adequately protected by copyright law acting alone.19 
 Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Eldred, in which the Court affirmed that First Amendment scrutiny can 
be appropriate in copyright cases.20 It discusses the rule set out by the 
Court in Eldred: that First Amendment scrutiny generally is not needed 
when a copyright law does not “alter[] the traditional contours of copy-
right protection.”21 Conversely, First Amendment scrutiny should be 
applied when a copyright law does alter the traditional contours of cop-
yright protection. The Article then discusses and rejects the argument 
made by some courts that the traditional contours of copyright protec-
tion are no more than the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
exception.22 Rather, I agree with a recent case from the U.S. District 
Court of Colorado, Golan v. Holder, which holds that changes to copy-
right law that significantly alter the public’s interaction with copyrighted 
and public domain works implicate interests deserving scrutiny under 
the First Amendment.23 
 Part II of this Article then extends the logic found in the Eldred 
and Golan cases to argue that the elimination of registration require-
ments and other formalities has significantly altered the traditional 
contours of copyright by greatly decreasing the public domain.24 Due to 
this alteration of the traditional contours of copyright, Part III asserts 
that First Amendment scrutiny is needed in a number of areas.25 I ar-
gue that judges applying First Amendment scrutiny to copyright laws in 
light of the changes in copyright law that vastly diminish the public 
domain will in some cases be constitutionally required to read accom-
modations of First Amendment interests into the copyright law cases 
                                                                                                                      
19 See infra notes 131–176 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 28–83 and accompanying text. 
21 See 537 U.S. at 221; infra notes 28–43 and accompanying text. 
22 See supra note 3. 
23 Golan v. Holder (Golan II ), 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009). 
24 See infra notes 86–130 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 131–176 and accompanying text. 
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that they are deciding.26 Part III concludes by describing several ad-
justments in copyright remedies that may be necessary when First 
Amendment scrutiny is applied.27 
I. Application of First Amendment Scrutiny to Copyright Laws 
 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of when First 
Amendment scrutiny should apply to copyright laws most recently in 
2003 in Eldred v. Ashcroft.28 The plaintiffs in Eldred challenged the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (the “CTEA”).29 The 
CTEA added twenty years to the term of copyright protection, so that 
for works produced after January 1, 1978, copyright protection lasts for 
the life of the author plus seventy years.30 For works for hire and works 
published before 1978 and still in copyright at the time of the CTEA, 
copyright was extended to ninety-five years.31 Plaintiffs in Eldred argued 
that extensions of copyright terms for new and previously published 
works impacted the speech interests of those who would make use of 
work that would otherwise fall into the public domain.32 Thus, plaintiffs 
argued, First Amendment scrutiny should be applied to the CTEA, and 
such scrutiny should result in the CTEA being held unconstitutional.33 
 After losing at the district and circuit court levels, plaintiffs argued 
their case before the Supreme Court.34 The Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower courts and rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the CTEA 
violated the First Amendment.35 The Court did “recognize that the 
D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categori-
cally immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’”36 But, 
said the Supreme Court, when Congress passes copyright legislation 
that does not “alter[] the traditional contours of copyright protection, 
further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”37 The Court noted 
                                                                                                                      
26 See infra notes 131–160 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 161–176 and accompanying text. 
28 See 537 U.S. 186, 218 (2003). 
29 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 17 U.S.C.). 
30 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
31 Id. § 302(c). 
32 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 194. 
35 Id. at 194, 221. 
36 Id. at 221 (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
37 Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)). 
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two important features of copyright law that protect First Amendment 
interests—the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.38 The idea/ 
expression dichotomy strikes a First Amendment balance in copyright 
law by allowing protection only of an author’s expression of her ideas, 
but not of the ideas themselves.39 Likewise, the fair use exemption to 
copyright protection allows use of copyrighted works, including direct 
copying and quotation, “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research,”40 and for purposes 
of parody.41 The Supreme Court also noted that the CTEA included 
specific additional protections for First Amendment interests, including 
the rights of libraries, archives, and similar organizations to make cer-
tain uses of works during their last twenty years of copyright for pur-
poses such as preservation, scholarship, or research,42 and exemptions 
for small businesses and restaurants from paying performance royalties 
for playing televisions or radios in their businesses.43 
 The Supreme Court’s Eldred decision was a defeat for the plaintiffs, 
but it was not a total defeat. The converse of the Court’s holding that 
First Amendment scrutiny is not necessary where a statute does not “al-
ter[] the traditional contours of copyright protection”44 is that, when a 
statute does alter those traditional contours, First Amendment review 
should apply. 
 But what are the “traditional contours” of copyright protection? 
The Court left this unanswered in Eldred. Are the traditional contours 
of copyright protection present so long as the idea/expression dichot-
omy and fair use protections remain in the Copyright Act? Or are the 
traditional contours of copyright protection altered whenever a statute 
passed under the copyright clause differs significantly from historical 
precedent?45 
                                                                                                                      
38 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20. 
39 Id. at 219. 
40 Id. at 220 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
41 Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)). 
42 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)). 
43 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)). 
44 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). 
45 A number of recent articles have grappled with these questions. Many commenta-
tors see a role for First Amendment inquiry beyond the protections built into the copy-
right statute. See, e.g., David Kohler, This Town Ain’t Big Enough for the Both of Us—or Is It? 
Reflections on Copyright, the First Amendment, and Google’s Use of Others’ Content, 2007 Duke L. 
& Tech. Rev. 0005, ¶ 51; Liu, supra note 12, at 439 (taking the view that the current con-
flict between copyright and free speech is inaccurate and instead “needs to be analyzed in 
terms of the copyright owner’s property interest versus the other party’s speech interest”); 
Christopher A. Mohr, Traditional Contours of Copyright: Silver Lining or Storm Clouds?, 1 No. 1 
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 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2007, in Golan v. 
Gonzales, addressed whether a specific change to copyright laws altered a 
traditional contour of copyright, thus necessitating First Amendment 
review.46 Plaintiffs in Golan challenged section 514 of the 1994 Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), which provided copyright protection 
to foreign works that were still in copyright in their country of origin, 
but were in the public domain in the United States because their au-
thors failed to comply with U.S. copyright law formalities, or because the 
United States did not recognize copyright from the author’s nation at 
the time the work was created.47 By agreeing to section 514 of the 
                                                                                                                      
Landslide 30, 34 (2008); Daniel Choi, Recent Development, Golan v. Gonzalez [sic]: The 
Stalemate Between the First Amendment and Copyright Continues, 9 N.C. J. L & Tech. 219, 233–
41 (2008); Carrie Claiborne, Comment, Golan v. Gonzales and the Changing Balance Between 
the First Amendment, Copyright Protection, and the Rest of the World, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1113, 
1128–32 (2009); Krystal Joy Gallagher, Note, Golan v. Gonzales: An Opportunity to Re-
examine the Relationship Between First Amendment Rights and Copyright Protection, 9 Nev. L. J. 
453, 453 (2009); William McGinty, Comment, First Amendment Rights to Protected Expression: 
What Are the Traditional Contours of Copyright Law?, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1099, 1140 
(2008) (advocating the application of First Amendment review to all amendments made to 
the copyright laws, arguing that only then will First Amendment interests be protected and 
suggesting that this review should take into account the “depth of the transgression” from 
the traditional contours of copyright law to determine what level of scrutiny is appropri-
ate); Matthew Miller, III, Note, Golan v. Gonzales: How Copyright Restoration Alters the Ordi-
nary Copyright Sequence and Invites First Amendment Review, 10 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 
353, 362 (2007); J. Blake Pinard, Note, Defending the Public Domain—The First Amendment, the 
Copyright Power, and the Potential of Golan v. Gonzales, 61 Okla. L. Rev. 395, 424 (2008); 
Recent Case, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007), 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1945, 
1946, 1949 (2008) (arguing that Golan, though consistent with Eldred’s traditional contours 
language, is flawed because “Golan’s history-based test . . . overlooks changes in copyright 
doctrine that undermine the assumption that copyright and the First Amendment are 
automatically compatible,” and by adopting a broad interpretation of historical tradition, 
can forgo all First Amendment scrutiny, and advocating an interpretation of Eldred that 
“require[s] First Amendment analysis whenever new legislation impairs speech interests in 
a manner that copyright’s internal protections cannot prevent or cure”). Others, like Ma-
rybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights, continue to believe that all needed First 
Amendment speech protection is internal to the copyright statute. See Marybeth Peters, 
Constitutional Challenges to Copyright Law, 30 Colum. J. L. & Arts 509, 529 (2007) (arguing 
that no First Amendment review is appropriate in copyright cases and stating “[w]hile the 
persons challenging the laws in each of these cases had something serious to say about 
whether the particular law reflected good policy or was otherwise flawed, there is nothing 
about any of these [copyright] statutes that takes them outside of Congressional power to 
legislate. What the courts are telling us is ‘if you don’t like the current state of the law, 
don’t complain to us. Talk to Congress.’”). 
46 Golan v. Gonzales (Golan I) 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007). I had a very minor 
role in this appeal as one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs. I emphasize that the opinions 
expressed in this Article are mine and mine alone. 
47 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–80 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 
109 (2006)). 
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URAA, the United States accepted Article 18 of the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), 
which it had previously refused to join for more than one hundred 
years.48 The Berne Convention requires member countries to give equal 
copyright treatment to foreign and domestic authors. It also does away 
with copyright formalities and requires that signatory countries grant 
copyright protection to foreign works if those foreign works still have 
copyright protection in their countries of origin.49 Thus, when the Unit-
ed States enacted legislation to comply with section 514 of the URAA, 
the legislation granted copyright status to certain foreign works that 
were previously in the public domain in the United States due either to 
copyright holders’ failure to comply with U.S. copyright formalities or 
failure to renew their copyrights.50 
 Plaintiffs in Golan each relied on artistic works in the public do-
main for their livelihood.51 The plaintiffs included orchestra conduc-
tors, educators, performers, publishers, archivists, and others who made 
use of works in the public domain.52 Many of the plaintiffs made use of 
these works because they could not afford to pay copyright licenses for 
uses that were often local or non-profit.53 Others had created derivative 
works based on foreign works in the public domain.54 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the URAA unconstitutionally interfered with their pro-
tected First Amendment interests in making use of public domain 
works.55 
 The district court disagreed, and held both that “Congress has his-
torically demonstrated little compunction about removing copyright-
able materials from the public domain” and that the plaintiffs had no 
First Amendment interests in the now-copyrighted foreign works.56 The 
plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which took a different view.57 
 The Tenth Circuit held that the URAA’s validity under the Copy-
right Clause did not make it immune to challenges based on other pro-
                                                                                                                      
48 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); 
Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1182 n.2. 
49 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109; Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1189. 
50 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109. 
51 501 F.3d at 1183. 
52 Id. at 1181. 
53 Id. at 1182. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1182–83. 
56 Id. at 1183 (quoting Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ. 01-B-1854 (BNB), 2005 WL 914754, 
at *14 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005)). 
57 Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1183. 
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visions of the Constitution, such as the First Amendment.58 The Tenth 
Circuit began by addressing the Supreme Court’s statement in Eldred 
that copyright laws should get the presumption of constitutionality vis-à-
vis the First Amendment, so long as the laws do not “alter[] the tradi-
tional contours of copyright protection.”59 After a detailed examination 
of the history of copyright laws in the United States, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that “the traditional contours of copyright protection in-
clude the principle that works in the public domain remain there and 
that § 514 [of the URAA] transgresses this critical boundary.”60 
 The Tenth Circuit analyzed how this alteration of the traditional 
contours of copyright affected the First Amendment interests of the 
plaintiffs.61 The court found two First Amendment interests that plain-
tiffs had in the formerly public domain foreign works.62 First, it held 
that everyone has a non-exclusive right to use material in the public 
domain.63 Second, it held that “the First Amendment protects plain-
tiffs’ right to unrestrained artistic use of these works.”64 
 Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, “at the moment that Dmitri 
Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 5 entered the public domain, Plaintiff 
John Blackburn had a right to create a derivative work for a high school 
                                                                                                                      
58 Id. at 1187 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 132 (1976)). 
59 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
60 Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1189. The D.C. Circuit came to the opposite conclusion—that 
removal of works from the public domain had been done several times in the past under 
federal copyright laws. See Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1265–66 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). But the Tenth Circuit’s analysis seems better-reasoned. The Tenth Circuit 
noted that the government’s purported examples of copyright laws that removed works 
from the public domain—such as the first Copyright Act passed in 1790, various laws allow-
ing registration of foreign works that could not be registered during World War II, and a 
handful of private bills—were at best exceptions to the traditional rule in copyright that 
works in the public domain stay there. Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1192. 
61 Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1192. 
62 Id. at 1192–93. 
63 Id. at 1192. 
64 Id. at 1193. The court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
right to artistic expression is near the core of the First Amendment.” Id. The Tenth Circuit 
explained that: 
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse 
in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known 
[music’s] capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have 
censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state. . . . The Con-
stitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order. Music, as a form 
of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment. 
Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)). 
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band to perform at an event commemorating 9/11.”65 Once created, 
the First Amendment protected Blackburn’s right to perform his de-
rivative work.66 Section 514 of the URAA impinged on Blackburn’s and 
the other plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights because the owners of the 
now-copyrighted original material could now charge fees for the per-
formance of plaintiffs’ derivative works.67 The court found the plain-
tiffs’ First Amendment interests greater than those of the plaintiffs in 
Eldred, because plaintiffs in Eldred had never enjoyed unfettered access 
to the works in question.68 The Golan plaintiffs, by contrast, used works 
in the public domain as the bases for public performances and to make 
derivative works of their own. Thus, by removing works from the public 
domain, the court held that section 514 of the URAA “hampers free 
expression and undermines the values the public domain is designed 
to protect.”69 
 The Tenth Circuit also held that “copyright’s built-in free speech 
safeguards are not adequate to protect the First Amendment interests 
at stake.”70 The court held that neither the idea/expression dichotomy 
nor the fair use defense were adequate to protect plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment interests in making use of the formerly public domain 
works.71 Although the idea/expression dichotomy protects speech in-
terests by allowing an author to copyright only her expression of an 
idea, but not the idea itself, in this case plaintiffs had previously had 
rights to the whole of the now-copyrighted works. The idea/expression 
dichotomy did not serve to protect these rights.72 Likewise, although 
fair use allows the use of a portion of a work for certain purposes such 
as “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or 
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (allowing creator of derivative work created while foreign 
work was in public domain to continue using work if reasonable compensation was paid to 
copyright owner, which compensation is determined via normal infringement damages 
analysis); Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1193. If the creator of the derivative work cannot pay the fee 
to the copyright owner, not only would he not be able to use his derivative work, but if the 
holding of cases such as Anderson v. Stallone is followed, the owner of the copyright in the 
original work could use the derivative work at will, and is the only party who could license 
others to use the derivative work. See, e.g., No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 25, 1989) (giving copyright owner exclusive rights to derivative work created 
without authorization). 
68 Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1193. 
69 Id. at 1193–94 (citing Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 372 (Fed. Cl. 1992)). 
70 Id. at 1196. 
71 Id. at 1194. 
72 Id. 
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research,” it could not serve to protect plaintiffs’ interests in using the 
whole of the works that had been removed from the public domain.73 
 In addition, the court noted that unlike the CTEA, the URAA did 
not supplement the traditional First Amendment safeguards of copy-
right law.74 When Congress passed the CTEA, it gave additional protec-
tions to certain users of the works whose terms were extended. The 
CTEA gave certain rights to libraries, archives, and similar institutions 
for their actions related to preservation, scholarship, or research in the 
last twenty years of a work’s copyright. The CTEA also exempted small 
businesses and restaurants from paying performance royalties for music 
or television programs played from the radio, television, or the like.75 
Unlike the CTEA, the URAA provided no supplemental First Amend-
ment protections, other than a one-year safe harbor for using a re-
stored work.76 
 The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for con-
sideration of whether section 514 of the URAA is content-based or con-
tent-neutral and whether it passes constitutional muster under the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny.77 On remand the district court held that the 
URAA is content neutral,78 and thus applied intermediate scrutiny.79 
Under intermediate scrutiny, the court held that the URAA violated 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests.80 The district court held: 
Congress has a legitimate interest in complying with the terms 
of the Berne Convention. The Berne Convention, however, 
affords each member nation discretion to restore the copy-
                                                                                                                      
73 Id. at 1195–96 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
74 Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1196. 
75 Id. at 1195–96 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h))). 
76 Id. at 1196 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2)). 
77 Id. 
78 Golan v. Holder (Golan II ), 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009) (“Here, the 
speech restricted is a general category of speech—namely, speech created by foreign au-
thors. The justification for the restriction lies in the protection of the authors’ interests in 
the expressions themselves, not the ideas the works encompass. Accordingly, Section 514 
must be reviewed under the ‘content-neutral’ standard.”) (internal citation omitted). 
79 Id. at 1170–71. The district court stated: 
While a content-neutral restriction must be “narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
nificant government interest” unrelated to the suppression of free speech, it 
“need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.” The 
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the restriction pro-
motes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the restriction. 
Id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 798–99). 
80 Id. at 1177. 
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rights of foreign authors in a manner consistent with that 
member nation’s own body of copyright law. In the United 
States, that body of law includes the bedrock principle that 
works in the public domain remain in the public domain. 
Removing works from the public domain violated Plaintiffs’ 
vested First Amendment interests. In light of the discretion af-
forded it by the Berne Convention, Congress could have 
complied with the Convention without interfering with Plain-
tiffs’ protected speech. Accordingly—to the extent Section 
514 suppresses the right of reliance parties to use works they 
exploited while the works were in the public domain—Section 
514 is substantially broader than necessary to achieve the 
Government’s interest.81 
 In determining that the URAA was not sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored, the district court may have considered footnote five of the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion. There the Tenth Circuit noted that in complying with 
the Berne Convention, the copyright laws of the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and India give parties who incurred any expenditure 
or liability in making use of a formerly public domain work the right to 
continued use of that work even after the work is covered by copy-
right.82 The copyright owner can only stop the relying party from using 
the work if the copyright owner pays compensation to the user of the 
work, in an amount determined by negotiation or arbitration.83 Thus, 
the district court had concrete examples of more narrowly tailored 
means to serve the Government’s interest in complying with the Berne 
Convention. 
II. Subjecting Copyright Law to First Amendment  
Scrutiny After Eldred 
 The discussions of the First Amendment and copyright in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft and Golan v. Gonzales raise the question: are there other areas of 
current copyright law that should be subject to First Amendment scru-
tiny? I believe that the answer is yes. Specifically, the abandonment of 
formalities and registration requirements that has occurred in the last 
three decades is a huge change to the traditional contours of copy-
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. 
82 Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1197 n.5. 
83 Id. (citing Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on Retroactive United States 
Copyright Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 157, 178 (1996)). 
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right.84 These changes have shifted the traditional balance between 
First Amendment interests and copyright interests in ways that signifi-
cantly impair First Amendment interests. Thus, certain adjustments to 
copyright may now be constitutionally required, even though they were 
not required in the past. Some of these necessary accommodations are 
discussed below. 
 As described earlier, the interests of speakers and listeners under 
the First Amendment are in tension with copyright law’s grant of exclu-
sivity to authors.85 The traditional argument has been that copyright en-
courages much more speech than it restricts,86 and only limits other’s 
rights to use copyrighted speech and the community’s right to hear co-
pyrighted speech for a reasonably limited time.87 But the elimination of 
registration requirements and formalities, along with term extensions in 
the last three decades, call this balance between First Amendment and 
copyright law into question and require First Amendment scrutiny and 
additional accommodations on the part of copyright law. 
 In the following paragraphs I briefly describe the changes to the 
traditional contours of copyright that have occurred in the last three 
decades.88 It is well known that the ways in which we create, distribute, 
critique, imitate, and copy writings and graphic arts have changed 
enormously in the three decades since the advent of the personal com-
puter.89 Much ink has been spilled and many pixels lighted detailing 
the powerful changes computers, cheap memory, digitization, the In-
ternet, and increasing broadband adoption have wrought in the way 
that content is created and copyright enforcement challenged.90 But at 
                                                                                                                      
84 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
85 See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 991, 995. 
86 See, e.g., Bendor, supra note 12, at 325; Goodman, supra note 12, at 1234; Liu, supra 
note 12, at 387. 
87 See, e.g., Bendor, supra note 12, at 325; Goodman, supra note 12, at 1234; Liu, supra 
note 12, at 387. 
88 I am by no means the first to describe how vastly copyright law has changed in re-
cent decades. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 18, 130–73; Garfield, supra note 1, at 1206; Joseph 
P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 409, 413–25 (2002); Christopher 
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 491–93 (2004). I believe I am, 
however, the first to frame this change as a massive alteration to the traditional contours of 
copyright necessitating First Amendment scrutiny in light of Eldred and Golan. 
89 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the 
Hybrid Economy (2008). 
90 See Note, Visual Artists’ Rights in a Digital Age, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1977, 1979 (1994). 
Commentators suggest: 
Digital technology is likely to bring about several changes, both positive and 
negative, in the art world. First, by enabling the making of perfect copies of 
copyrighted works for little cost, digital technology threatens to undermine 
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least as important as technological changes are the profound changes 
to copyright law itself that have resulted in an unprecedented increase 
in the number of works copyrighted and the length of time copyright 
endures. In 1976—the same year that the Apple I personal computer 
was created91—Congress changed copyright law from an “opt-in” regis-
tration system, in which less than half of all new works were copyrighted 
each year and the average copyright lasted less than three decades,92 to 
a longer-term automatic copyright system from which it is relatively dif-
ficult to “opt-out.”93 
 Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, authors had to comply with for-
malities and register their works in order to receive copyright protec-
tion.94 The result was that about half of otherwise-qualifying works were 
never registered.95 In addition, the copyright term was fairly short be-
                                                                                                                      
the current entertainment product distribution systems and increase unau-
thorized use of copyrighted works. Second, digital technology increases the 
public’s access to others’ creations by enabling entertainment producers to 
create and distribute products of all kinds in a single (digital) format. 
See id. (internal citation omitted). See generally Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) (detail-
ing the rise of digital technologies); Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping 
Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1831 (2009) (examining technology and copy-
right law); Mary L. Mills, Note, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An Argu-
ment for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change, 65 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 307 (1989)(describing challenges copyright law faces in light of chang-
ing technologies). 
91 Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs created the Apple I computer in March 1976, and 
founded Apple Computer, Co. on April Fools’ Day, 1976. See Lev Grossman, 80 Days That 
Changed the World: April 1, 1976, Time.com, Mar. 23, 2003, http://www.time.com/time/ 
80days/760401.html. In March 1977, they created the Apple II computer, which many con-
sider to have been the first affordable and easily-usable personal computer. See Inventor of 
the Week Archive, Steve Jobs & Steve Wozniak, The Personal Computer, http://web. 
mit.edu/invent/iow/apple.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
92 See Sprigman, supra note 88, at 491–93. 
93 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of  17 U.S.C.). 
94 1909 Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976). 
95 See Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the Duration of Copyright in the United States and 
European Union: Procedure and Policy, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J 579, 600–
02 (1994) (explaining that works created before January 1, 1978, were subject to statutory 
formalities that, if not met, caused works to fall into the public domain, and consequently, 
a large number of works governed by the 1909 Act are out of copyright due to failure to 
comply with the 1909 Act’s formalities); Sprigman, supra note 88, at 519. Professor Sprig-
man explains: 
Until it was eliminated by the 1976 Act (for pre-1978 works) and the Copy-
right Renewal Act (for all other works), the renewal formality served as an-
other filter, one that operated later in the lifecycle of the copyrighted work as 
an ex post test of commercial viability. . . . Historically, approximately 15% of 
works were renewed, meaning that 85% of works moved into the public do-
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fore 1976, lasting only fourteen years at first,96 and eventually extending 
to twenty-eight years.97 If an author wanted to renew his copyright, he 
had to pay a fee and officially renew the work.98 Approximately eighty-
five percent of copyrighted works were never renewed.99 This regime 
meant that for the entirety of U.S. history prior to the 1976 Copyright 
Act, (1) many works of authorship were never covered by copyright at 
all, and (2) the vast majority of copyrighted works lost copyright protec-
tion within fourteen to twenty-eight years.100 
 The 1976 Copyright Act worked a sea change on the practice of 
copyright in the United States. The Act included two important altera-
tions. It extended copyright terms to life of the author plus fifty years, 
and it did away with the registration requirement and all formalities for 
achieving copyright protection for a work.101 Thus, since January 1, 
1978, virtually every bit of expression set down in a “tangible medium” 
has automatically received copyright protection for life of the author 
plus fifty years and seventy-five years for certain older works and works 
made for hire.102 Subsequently, the CTEA extended all copyright terms 
                                                                                                                      
main—by consent of rightsholders—after a relatively short term of protec-
tion. 
Sprigman, supra note 88, at 519. 
96 1790 Copyright Act, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). 
97 1870 Copyright Act, ch. 230, § 90, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909); R. Anthony Reese, 
Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copyright and Duration and 
Reversion, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 707, 716 (1995) (describing that the 1870 Copyright Act pro-
vided for a bipartite copyright term: a twenty-eight-year original term followed by a four-
teen-year renewal term; the 1909 Copyright Act granted an author a copyright that lasted 
for an original term of twenty-eight years, and provided for a renewal and extension of an 
additional twenty-eight years, extending the maximum copyright term to fifty-six years). 
98 Sprigman, supra note 88, at 493 (“[A]t its inception the American copyright system 
required compliance with a series of formalities that included registration, deposit, and 
notice via both marking and published announcement.”). 
99 Id. at 519. 
100 Id. at 522; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217 (1990) (“Since the earliest 
copyright statute in this country, the copyright term of ownership has been split between 
an original term and a renewal term.”). 
101 See Netanel, supra note 4, at 23. 
102 If an author does not want the full extent of copyright protection, he must affirma-
tively opt-out of the default maximum copyright protection. An author may either disclaim 
copyright in his work or choose to reserve only limited rights via licenses such as those pro-
vided by Creative Commons. See, e.g., Licenses, Creative Commons, http://creativecommons. 
org/about/licenses (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). Only a small percentage of authors disclaim 
copyright or limit their copyright interest in their works, however, resulting in a vast majority 
of material that is automatically covered for the maximum term of copyright. See Sprigman, 
supra note 88, at 491 (explaining that an opt-out system provides that many “dead” works 
remain “locked-up” and unavailable for public use). 
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to life of the author plus seventy years and to ninety-five years for cer-
tain older works and works made for hire.103 
 Congress made these changes out of concern for copyright owners 
and to comply with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, which mandated that formalities could not be used 
to bar copyright in many circumstances.104 Congress may also have been 
independently concerned that copyright owners were losing their copy-
rights due to carelessness in complying with copyright formalities.105 
Eliminating the formalities eliminated the problem. Likewise, when 
Congress extended copyright terms after intense lobbying from corpo-
rate copyright owners like the Walt Disney Company, Congress was con-
cerned with keeping valuable intellectual property in U.S. companies’ 
hands.106 What Congress does not seem to have focused on is the inter-
est of users of copyrighted works. Making copyright owners register and 
renew their copyrights put the burden of attaining and keeping copy-
right—which was already low—on the copyright owners, who had the 
best information as to copyright value and thus were the least cost 
avoiders. Likewise, although copyright term extension benefited a select 
group of copyright owners who owned works that had long-term value, 
it denied the public the right to unrestricted use of both commercially 
valuable and non-valuable copyrighted works for an additional twenty 
years. 
 The significance of these copyright law changes on those who 
would quote, copy, or otherwise use another’s pre-existing work should 
not be underestimated. A researcher working before 1978 would safely 
assume that things published more than fifty-six years ago were in the 
public domain and could be used freely. He would also likely assume 
that anything out of print and published longer than twenty-eight years 
ago was in the public domain, and he would be correct about eighty-
five percent of the time. Finally, if a work bore no copyright notice, he 
would know immediately that the work was not covered by copyright 
and that he could freely use it. 
                                                                                                                      
103 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302 (2006). 
104 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
The Berne Convention is available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_ 
wo001.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
105 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 471, 500 (2003) (“[W]e cannot dismiss the possibility that some fraction of 
nonrenewals are due to simple oversight, or careless failure to comply with required for-
malities.”). 
106 See id. at 483 (noting “Disney’s successful efforts to lobby for the Sonny Bono [Cop-
yright Term Extension] Act”). 
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 Today’s would-be user of copyrighted material faces a different 
scenario entirely. He knows that anything published since 1978 is au-
tomatically copyrighted for the life of the author plus seventy years. He 
knows that he may only safely use materials published over eighty-five 
years ago—prior to 1923.107 For works published between 1923 and 
1976, he must trace the history of registration and renewal to deter-
mine copyright status.108 Although the pre-1976 Act researcher could 
make use of the vast majority of materials from just a generation or two 
earlier without running afoul of copyrights, today’s researcher may 
need to seek copyright permission to use many materials from the last 
three or four generations. The researcher of 2108 will need to seek 
permission to use all materials created in the preceding seventy years 
and many works that are over one hundred years old will remain cov-
ered by copyright. 
 Some may see little cause for concern because use of others’ work 
has a flavor of theft to it—one thinks of college students lobbying for 
the destruction of copyright so that they may download music freely. 
But an ever-growing body of literature points out that the more one 
looks at the concepts of novelty and originality in authorship, the more 
one realizes that, one way or another, there truly is (as Ecclesiastes tells 
us) “nothing new under the sun.”109 For instance, in Judge Richard 
Posner’s recent book, The Little Book of Plagiarism, Posner discusses the 
fact that Shakespeare could not have created his brilliant plays without 
extensive—and uncredited—use of numerous, and often recent, his-
torical, and literary sources.110 Likewise, only a couple of generations 
ago, it was expected that persons of letters would quote without attribu-
tion from the works of others.111 Such allusions were the mark of a well-
read person. 
                                                                                                                      
107 Works published prior to 1923 are in the public domain because prior to the 1976 
Copyright Act, the 1909 Copyright Act provided a maximum term of fifty-six years (twenty-
eight-year original term plus twenty-eight-year renewal term). See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 
1976). The 1976 Act only extended copyright terms for works still in copyright. See 17 
U.S.C. § 304 (2006). Thus, those works published before 1923 that had already entered the 
public domain remain there. 
108 See 17 U.S.C. § 304. 
109 See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Val-
ues in Early American Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 186, 188 n.4 (2008) (collecting numerous 
sources); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371, 411 
(2005) (arguing with regard to patented inventions that “in a very real sense there is noth-
ing new under the sun”). 
110 See Richard A. Posner, The Little Book of Plagiarism 51–74 (2007). 
111 Id. at 54–64. 
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 But even when a user of copyrighted materials seeks to document 
each quote assiduously and to add value to a work rather than to divert 
sales, copyright law can stymie non-exploitative use of copyrighted ma-
terial. The 2007 case of Shloss v. Estate of James Joyce is a good example.112 
In that case, Carol Shloss, a Stanford professor and James Joyce scholar, 
wrote a book on Joyce’s relationship with his daughter Lucia and the 
way that relationship and Lucia’s artistic work impacted Joyce’s book, 
Finnegans Wake.113 Shloss’s book in no way competed for sales with Fin-
negans Wake or any of the other materials from which she quoted. If an-
ything, her book served as a complementary good that increased inter-
est in Finnegans Wake. Nevertheless, because the copyright in Joyce’s 
works is controlled by his grandson ( Joyce died in 1941), who refused 
any discussion of licensing his grandfather’s work for research into his 
aunt’s life, Shloss’s book was gutted of many of the supporting quota-
tions before publication.114 After receiving pro bono representation 
from Lawrence Lessig and the Stanford Law School Center for Internet 
and Society’s Fair Use Project, Shloss sued for a declaratory judgment 
of fair use in order to post the supporting quotations on her academic 
website. After a period of intense litigation, Shloss won her right to 
quote Joyce’s work as needed for her project.115 The story ended hap-
pily for Shloss, though only after much time and aggravation. But she 
never would have had to fight that fight under the pre-1976 Act regime. 
And many authors never would have found the resources to fight. 
 Copyright does not only affect those wanting to quote written ma-
terials. Because dramatic arts such as music, choreography, and plays 
are also copyrighted, under the post-1976 Act regime, a community 
theater may not use dramatic works without license.116 Thus, many of 
the works of the last eighty-five years are off-limits to those who cannot 
pay a license fee. In practical effect, this also makes many works off-
limits to the audiences of these community theaters and similar estab-
lishments, who now will not hear as many works from the last century. 
And going forward copyright will only be more restrictive, so that the 
majority of works from the previous century will be copyrighted. 
 The 1976 Copyright Act’s elimination of formalities had other pro-
found effects. As discussed above, prior to 1978, over ninety percent of 
                                                                                                                      
112 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007). I served as counsel for Professor Shloss in 
this case. Accordingly, I emphasize that the opinions expressed here are my own. 
113 See Carol Loeb Shloss, Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake (2003). 
114 Shloss v. Estate of James Joyce, 515 F. Supp.2d 1068, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
115 Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1085–86. 
116 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
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works were in the public domain by the time of their renewal.117 Ap-
proximately half of all published works had never been copyrighted, 
and about eighty-five percent of copyrighted works did not have their 
copyrights renewed.118 Of the small percentage of works whose copy-
rights were renewed, determining who owned the copyright was fairly 
straightforward.119 Not only did the work have to be published with no-
tice and registered, but upon renewal the copyright owner was on re-
cord again.120 Thus, if one wanted to use a copyrighted work, generally 
one could quickly and easily determine with whom one should be ne-
gotiating. The abandonment of formalities and automatic term renewal 
has changed all of this and created a huge number of “orphan works.” 
 “Orphan works” is a term used to describe the many works that are 
now in copyright but are out of print, and for which it is difficult to de-
termine the copyright owner.121 Because copyright now lasts so long, 
even when the original creator of a work can be easily identified, it may 
be very difficult to determine who owns the copyright after the origina-
tor has died. Although the ownership of copyrights in valuable works by 
famous authors is usually established at the time of death when other 
assets are divided, ownership of the copyrights of more ordinary people 
is less likely to be determined upon death. Thus, such rights likely pass 
with the residue of the estate.122 And once copyright ownership has 
passed beyond the original author, it may continue to be sold, given, or 
                                                                                                                      
117 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
118 See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1, 15 
(2004). 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 U.S. Register of Copyrights, Report on Orphan Works 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf. 
122 See Lessig, supra note 18, at 223. Professor Lessig explains why the determination 
of ownership for lesser-known works is difficult: 
As I’ve already described, there’s no list of copyright owners. There are au-
thors’ names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or 
passed down in an estate like Grandma’s old jewelry. To know who owns what, 
you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom line: The owner can-
not easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in which it is a felony to use 
such property without the property owner’s permission, the property isn’t go-
ing to be used. 
Id.; see also Lee-Ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 
Rutgers L.J. 109, 112 (2006) (“Current copyright law, however, imposes a unique 
restraint on the testamentary freedom of authors. The Copyright Act of 1976 . . . 
permits a statutorily designated group of heirs—ones not necessarily selected by the 
author—to control the disposition of the author’s copyright interests after death.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
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devised in a series of private, non-centrally recorded transactions. The 
puzzle of ownership can take significant time and energy to sort out, if 
the ownership interests can be sorted at all without an opinion from a 
court.123 
 Given that the traditional contours of copyright law worked to cre-
ate a large public domain of recent works, how should First Amend-
ment scrutiny be applied to our modern copyright law regime of a 
much-diminished public domain? First, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit is plainly correct in holding that the traditional con-
tours of copyright protection must extend farther than the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense.124 Although these 
traditional safeguards do much to protect First Amendment interests, 
one can easily imagine legislation passed under the 1976 Copyright Act 
that would impinge on First Amendment interests notwithstanding the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense. Plaintiffs in the 
2007 case of Kahle v. Gonzales—which challenged copyright law, in part, 
under the First Amendment—provide one such example.125 Noting 
that “copyright law has traditionally been viewpoint neutral,” plaintiffs 
set forth the following scenario: “Imagine the European Union decided 
to deny copyright protection to ‘hate speech,’ and Congress, in an ef-
fort to ‘harmonize’ international copyright law, did the same.”126 The 
plaintiffs asked whether, in such a case, First Amendment review would 
be appropriate. It obviously would. 
 Likewise, due to the significant changes to the traditional contours 
of copyright, which have resulted in a vastly-diminished public domain, 
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrines cannot come 
close to adequately protecting the public’s interests in speech that once 
would have entered the public domain quickly and is now locked up 
for a century or more. Indeed, affirming that First Amendment review 
of copyright laws may be necessary in cases such as these does no more 
than affirm the general rule that legislation drafted under one consti-
tutional provision must be consistent with the remainder of the Consti-
tution.127 
                                                                                                                      
123 See Tritt, supra note 122, at 112. 
124 Golan v. Gonzales (Golan I ), 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007). 
125 See 487 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting plaintiffs’ First Amendment chal-
lenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act based in part on Eldred). 
126 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kahle, No. 07-189, 2007 WL 2323450, at *15 (Aug. 
10, 2007). 
127 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999). The Saenz Court noted that: 
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 Eldred should not be understood as a case defining when the Copy-
right Clause trumps the First Amendment, or holding that a couple of 
safeguards within copyright law are sufficient to protect all First 
Amendment interests that might arise under any conceivable copyright 
law. Rather, Eldred is better understood as setting forth a simple rule of 
judicial economy. Eldred makes two simple and straightforward assump-
tions.128 First, the copyright laws that have developed over the last 200-
plus years in the United States have adequately protected speech inter-
ests, and are therefore constitutional.129 Second, if a copyright law con-
forms to these “traditional contours of copyright protection” developed 
over the last 200 years, a court may presume that the law adequately pro-
tects speech interests, and may forgo First Amendment review.130 But 
where a copyright law does not conform to long-standing historical 
practice, no presumption of First Amendment compliance can be made. 
III. Copyright Law Accommodations of First  
Amendment Interests 
 As I have discussed above, the overall landscape of copyright law is 
now very different than it has been for most of the history of the Unit-
ed States.131 The contours of copyright law going forward will consist of 
a virtually non-existent public domain for works published in the last 
seventy to one hundred fifty years. Compared to the landscape before 
registration and formalities were eliminated in 1976—in which many 
works were never copyrighted and the vast majority were out of copy-
right within twenty-eight years—the current contours of copyright are 
about as untraditional as one could imagine.132 Moreover, the ability of 
the public to make use of, and hear, copyright-eligible speech has been 
severely impacted. This significant change to the traditional contours of 
copyright law permeates and affects copyright law generally. The bal-
ance between First Amendment speech interests and individuals’ inter-
                                                                                                                      
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate in cer-
tain areas. Those legislative powers are, however, limited not only by the 
scope of the Framers’ affirmative delegation, but also by the principle that 
they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of 
the Constitution. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
128 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 218–20 (2003). 
129 See id.at 208, 218. 
130 Id. at 218–20. 
131 See supra notes 30–130 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
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ests in commenting on, using, or hearing copyright-eligible speech has 
been changed so severely as to have been, in practical effect, upended. 
This upending so thoroughly affects individuals’ First Amendment in-
terests that numerous accommodations are needed to restore the bal-
ance so that copyright law encourages speech as much as it restricts it. 
 I will now discuss how copyright law should be scrutinized under 
the First Amendment and some of the accommodations that taking 
First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law seriously will entail. The 
best place to begin is with the changes to copyright law in the 1976 
Copyright Act that eliminated registration and formalities.133 Should 
these changes to copyright law be subjected to First Amendment scru-
tiny, and if so, can they withstand such scrutiny? 
A. Accommodations to Registration/Formalities Regime 
 I should note at the outset that the elimination of formalities has 
never been scrutinized under the First Amendment. It is true that the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the 2007 case of Kahle v. 
Gonzales held that the retroactive elimination of formalities did not 
raise the need for First Amendment scrutiny.134 But the court there ex-
plicitly limited its consideration to the challenge to retroactivity rather 
than to whether the elimination of copyright formalities alters the tra-
ditional contours of copyright.135 Indeed, although the court acknowl-
edged that the change from opt-in copyright to opt-out copyright is 
very significant,136 it never directly dealt with the constitutionality of 
formalities because it focused on the fact that the plaintiffs only chal-
lenged the elimination of formalities retroactively during a limited pe-
riod.137 Thus the Ninth Circuit addressed only the question of whether 
Congress had power to apply copyright laws retroactively, which Eldred 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
134 See 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 
135 The plaintiffs characterized this as a change from an “opt-in” copyright system to an 
“opt-out” system. Id. Under the previous, opt-in system, formalities were required to gain 
copyright protection, and most copyrighted works were not renewed. Thus, the opt-in 
system created a large public domain. See id. 
136 The court accepted that renewal requirements both limited orphan works and 
made it so that “only a small percentage” of creative works were under copyright for the 
maximum term. Id. The court also acknowledged that “[e]liminating the renewal re-
quirement dramatically increased the average copyright term and correspondingly de-
creased the number of works currently entering the public domain.” Id. 
137 The plaintiffs in Kahle limited their challenge to the elimination of renewal re-
quirements for works created between 1964 and 1977. They did not challenge the elimina-
tion of the renewal requirement or of other formalities generally. See id. at 699–700. 
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v. Ashcroft had held it did.138 The question of whether eliminating for-
malities is a change in the traditional contours of copyright such that 
First Amendment scrutiny should be applied therefore has not yet been 
raised or decided. This Article attempts to answer that question. 
 In evaluating the constitutionality of the 1976 Copyright Act’s eli-
mination of formalities, the first issue to address is whether the act is 
already beyond reproach under the First Amendment. After all, in 
many areas of life and law, three decades is a long enough time for a 
change in law to become a “traditional contour.” Indeed, a young gen-
eration of authors has grown up without any need to concern itself with 
formalities. Is this enough to qualify the elimination of formalities as 
constitutional under the First Amendment without need for further 
inquiry? The answer seems almost certainly no. Because the Eldred rule 
is best thought of as one of judicial economy, and because the elimina-
tion of formalities worked such a significant change to the nearly two 
centuries of copyright law that came before, the elimination of formali-
ties should not be held to be a traditional contour of copyright such 
that it prima facie is immune to any First Amendment review. 
 Once First Amendment review is deemed appropriate, the First 
Amendment interests at stake must be identified. The interests are the 
ones that have already been identified in this Article—the public’s in-
terest in not having its rights to use and hear copyright-eligible materi-
als drastically reduced for a very long time. Indeed, the First Amend-
ment interests of the public in having a rich public domain of recent 
works are significantly and negatively affected by the elimination of 
formalities.139 
 Of course, under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the public’s 
First Amendment interests that are negatively affected by the change in 
the law may have to give way if the elimination of formalities is never-
theless “narrowly tailored to serve . . . substantial government inter-
                                                                                                                      
138 Instead of delving into whether the elimination of the renewal requirement 
changed the traditional contours of copyright law, the court treated the question as 
whether Congress could place existing copyrighted work in parity with future works by 
eliminating the renewal requirement for both, and held that Eldred summarily disposed of 
this question. See id. at 700. According to the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
already ruled “that when Congress passed the CTEA, it ‘placed existing and future copy-
rights in parity. In prescribing that alignment . . . Congress acted within its authority and 
did not transgress constitutional limitations.’” Id. (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 194 (2003)). Thus, a broad reading of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Kahle would 
mean that under Eldred any retroactive change in copyright law is constitutional so long as 
the change is aimed at providing parity for existing and future works. 
139 See infra notes 153–160 and accompanying text. 
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est.”140 Thus, to properly analyze the validity of the 1976 Act’s elimina-
tion of formalities under the First Amendment, one must determine 
the government interests at stake.141 There are three government inter-
ests potentially served by the elimination of formalities. First, the gov-
ernment has an interest in harmonizing domestic copyright law with 
international law, and thus has an interest in complying with the Berne 
Convention.142 Second, eliminating formalities and extending copy-
right terms gives greater protection to all written work, and could thus 
be said to further incentivize authorship, although the amount of addi-
tional incentive is economically miniscule.143 Finally, the government 
can point to its equitable interest in preventing the loss of copyright for 
authors who fail to achieve copyright on their works due solely to tech-
nical missteps that prevent them from complying with copyright for-
malities.144 
 Although each of these interests may seem significant, the ques-
tion is whether the complete elimination of formalities is “narrowly tai-
lored” to serve these interests. Taking the last two interests first, there 
surely are ways to incentivize authorship without eliminating formali-
ties. In fact, Congress has engaged in just such incentivization by in-
creasing copyright terms repeatedly.145 Thus, the complete elimination 
of formalities does not seem narrowly tailored to incentivize author-
ship. 
 Likewise, the government’s interest in ensuring that authors do 
not forfeit all rights to their works due to inadvertent failure to comply 
with formalities does not demand a complete elimination of all formali-
ties. Rather, limited rights for authors to revive inadvertently-lost copy-
rights could serve this interest with a much narrower fit. 
 When it comes to the government’s interest in complying with the 
Berne Convention, however, because the Convention demands the 
elimination of formalities that affect the enjoyment and exercise of 
economic rights related to copyright, it seems at first glance that there 
is no more narrowly tailored way to comply with the Convention than 
through the elimination of formalities.146 
                                                                                                                      
140 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989). 
141 Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 70 (1983) (“We must . . . de-
termine whether the Government’s interest . . . is a substantial one.”). 
142 Golan v. Holder (Golan II ), 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009). 
143 Golan v. Gonzales (Golan I ), 501 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2007). 
144 Golan II, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
145 See Netanel, supra note 4, at 23. 
146 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
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 But first impressions can be deceiving. Christopher Sprigman has 
written extensively about how a system of voluntary compliance with 
formalities and registration could be adopted in the United States that 
would comply with the Berne Convention but better protect the inter-
ests of the public in using and hearing copyright-eligible material, es-
pecially when it comes to orphan works.147 Sprigman proposes that the 
United States adopt “new-style formalities” that “preserve formally vol-
untary registration, notice, and recordation of transfers (and reestab-
lish a formally voluntary renewal formality) for all works . . . but then 
incent compliance by exposing the works of noncompliant rightshold-
ers to a ‘default’ license that allows use for a predetermined fee.”148 
 The 1976 Copyright Act already contains an incentive that encour-
ages registration of copyrighted works. If an author does not register her 
work within three months of publication, she is not eligible to seek at-
torney’s fees or statutory damage awards in infringement cases.149 This is 
a considerable incentive because statutory damages range from $750 to 
$30,000 per work infringed,150 and can be increased to $150,000 per 
work infringed if a court finds that the defendant’s infringement was 
willful.151 One might think that requiring registration to be eligible for 
statutory damages would encourage widespread registration of copy-
righted works, but this is not the case. Although large commercial enti-
ties holding valuable copyrighted works do scrupulously register their 
copyrights,152 smaller entities and individual authors often do not regis-
ter within the required three months from publication.153 In addition, 
many works that are thought to be of little commercial value are never 
registered. Moreover, even works that are initially registered are not 
immune from becoming orphan works. Because copyright now subsists 
for such a long period of time, the lack of any requirement to renew or 
register transfers creates orphan works.154 For the person who would like 
to make use of that work but cannot locate the copyright holder, the 
                                                                                                                      
147 See Sprigman, supra note 88, at 555. 
148 Id. 
149 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(f), 412 (2006). 
150 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
151 Id. § 504(c)(2). 
152 See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Rem-
edy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2009) (manuscript at 12, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375604) (describing the registration requirement 
as “a substantial boon to major copyright industry players”). 
153 See id. (“Because individual authors and small firms do not typically register their 
copyrights within three months of publication, they rarely qualify for statutory damages or 
attorney’s fee awards.”); see also Sprigman, supra note 88, at 496. 
154 See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text. 
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fear of a statutory damages award will often chill even a use that has First 
Amendment value and that would cause little or no actual damage to 
the copyright holder. 
 Thus, Sprigman’s suggestion that we incentivize authors not only 
to register their works initially, but also to renew their works and regis-
ter ownership changes makes sense.155 I do not believe that we have to 
go as far as giving only low predetermined fines to copyright owners 
who do not register their works, however. Rather, simply tying the avail-
ability of statutory damages to renewing and registering ownership 
changes would go a long way toward lifting some of the excessive chill 
of First Amendment speech that the current copyright regime creates, 
especially when it comes to works that were originally registered but 
whose current rightsholders are unknown.156 
 The First Amendment may require that some system such as 
Sprigman’s be adopted to limit the effect of the abandonment of for-
malities and provide additional protection to the First Amendment in-
terests of those who would use or hear copyrighted speech. Thus, First 
Amendment interests may require that absent voluntary registration 
and renewal, only default royalty payments or license rates may be 
charged against infringers rather than actual damages. Or use of unreg-
istered works could make a user liable only for payment of a predeter-
mined fee, somewhat like the compulsory mechanical license available 
for use of composition copyrights.157 
 Another accommodation of First Amendment interests would be 
achieved by adopting Joseph Liu’s proposal that “the older a copy-
righted work is, the greater the scope of fair use should be.”158 Liu bases 
his proposal on one of the same issues that concerns this Article: that 
copyright term extension has left us with a greatly diminished public 
domain.159 Liu argues that increasing the scope of fair use as a work 
ages both serves the public’s increasing interest in being able to reuse 
older works, and does not excessively diminish incentives to produce 
copyrighted works.160 This suggestion, although sensible in its own 
right, also comports with First Amendment interests in using older 
                                                                                                                      
155 Sprigman, supra note 88, at 555 (arguing for a system that would “preserve formally 
voluntary registration, notice, and recordation of transfers  . . . but then incent compliance 
by exposing the works of noncompliant rightsholders to a ‘default’ license that allows use 
for a [low] predetermined fee”). 
156 Cf id. 
157 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). 
158 See Liu, supra note 88, at 410. 
159 Id. at 411. 
160 Id. at 412. 
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works that once would have been available to the public but now will 
remain in copyright for many additional decades. 
B. Accommodations in Copyright Remedies 
 First Amendment analysis of the current copyright law regime may 
also necessitate adjustments to remedies available against copyright de-
fendants. The vastly different contours of current copyright law may re-
quire changes and lessening of damages in certain kinds of copyright 
cases. Current copyright law gives plaintiffs the option to pursue statu-
tory damages instead of actual damages.161 Statutory damages can be 
extremely high, up to $150,000 per infringement.162 Moreover, statutory 
damages may be imposed in the absence of any proof of actual dam-
ages.163 Courts may even award statutory damages that are many multi-
ples above any actual damages in order to deter copyright infringement 
that may be either difficult to detect or expensive to prosecute.164 In-
stances of the application of statutory damages in the current copyright 
regime—in which members of the public have much greater need to 
make use of copyrighted works because the public domain has been so 
diminished—should be scrutinized under the First Amendment to de-
termine whether such damages unduly burden First Amendment inter-
ests in a way not narrowly tailored to significant government interests.165 
                                                                                                                      
161 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006). Note that to qualify for statutory damages, an author 
must have registered her work within three months of publication. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(f), 
412 (2006). 
162 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 
163 See, e.g., Special Verdict Form at 17–20, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 
06-CV-1497 (MJD/RLE), 2009 WL 1717117 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009) (finding defendant 
who shared music files using peer-to-peer software liable for willful copyright infringement 
and awarding $80,000 per song); Jury Verdict Form at 2–8, Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. 
Tenenbaum, Nos. 03-CV-11661-NG, 07-CV-11446-NG, 2009 WL 2390631 (D. Mass. June 15, 
2009) (finding defendant liable for $22,500 per act of willful infringement for sharing 
music files using peer-to-peer technology); Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008) (ordering new trial in peer-to-peer file sharing case after jury 
found defendant liable for statutory damages in the amount of $9,250 per each act of in-
fringement without a showing of actual distribution of infringing works). 
164 See Ben Sheffner, Oy Tenenbaum! RIAA Wins $675,000, or $22,500 per Song, Ars Tech-
nica ( July 31, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/o-tenenbaum-riaa-
wins-675000-or-22500-per-song.ars (describing plaintiff’s satisfaction with award of statutory 
damages because it “recogni[zes] the impact of illegal downloading on the music commu-
nity”); cf. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227 (urging Congress to reexamine copyright liability 
and damages in peer-to-peer file-sharing cases because high statutory damages are not a de-
terrent). 
165 Indeed, large awards of statutory damages may raise constitutional concerns in ad-
dition to the First Amendment concerns discussed in this Article. Pamela Samuelson and 
Tara Wheatland have a forthcoming article arguing that a number of statutory damage 
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In other words, under the modern and non-traditional regime of copy-
right law, we should be at least as worried about speech-chilling overdet-
terence from statutory damages as we are about risks of underdeter-
rence. 
 This is not to say that an application of the First Amendment re-
quires doing away with all statutory damages. In some cases high statu-
tory damages continue to make sense. For instance, commercial piracy 
of copyrighted works can be highly profitable and has only gotten eas-
ier in the digital age.166 To deter repeat offenders, both large damages 
and criminal sanctions, including prison time, may be necessary.167 But 
in other cases the availability of statutory damages and the uncertainty 
of their application serve to unduly chill First Amendment expression, 
as many commentators have noted.168 Judges in copyright cases should 
thus take First Amendment concerns into account when crafting dam-
ages awards, and should be constrained by the First Amendment from 
granting damages in excess of actual damages in some cases. Examples 
of where the First Amendment may act to bar statutory damages are 
close cases of infringement when the defendant raises reasonable ar-
guments of noninfringement (e.g. idea/expression, merger, derivative 
work) or a reasonable fair use defense. At a minimum, in such cases 
consideration of the need for copyright law to balance First Amend-
                                                                                                                      
awards in copyright cases have been made at multiples above actual damages that are sig-
nificantly higher than damages multiples that the Supreme Court has struck down in other 
areas of law as violating constitutional due process protections. See Samuelson & Wheat-
land, supra note 152, at 32–41. 
166 See, e.g., Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227 (“The myriad of copyright cases cited by 
Plaintiffs and the Government, in which courts upheld large statutory damages awards . . . 
have limited relevance in this case. All of the cited cases involve corporate or business de-
fendants and seek to deter future illegal commercial conduct.”) (emphasis added). 
167 See id. 
168 See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 1, at 1206. Professor Garfield states that: 
If copyright damages raise the specter of plaintiffs receiving punitive-like 
damages—because of the risk of high statutory damages awards, particularly 
if an infringement is found to be willful—then many parties will avoid using 
copyrighted works even if they believe that their use is a fair use or will only 
result in minimal harm to a copyright owner. In these instances, the First 
Amendment should place limits on statutory damages so that parties making 
limited use of copyrighted works will not be deterred by the threat of these 
damages. 
Id.; accord Celia Goldwag, Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 Colum. L. 
Rev. 320, 336 (1979) (“Certain aspects of copyright’s remedial scheme are more trouble-
some from a first amendment standpoint. . . . When statutory damages exceed what would 
be necessary to compensate the copyright holder, they have the effect of penalizing the 
infringer’s speech.”). 
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ment interests may prohibit awards of statutory damages far in excess of 
actual damages. 
 Some courts are already doing a good job of considering First 
Amendment interests when awarding statutory damages. In Warner 
Brothers v. RDR Books, the defendant relied on a fair use defense in cre-
ating and seeking to publish an encyclopedia of J.K. Rowling’s Harry 
Potter series.169 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that the defendant’s encyclopedia did not qualify for 
fair use because the defendant used too much of Rowling’s work with-
out enough transformation of the material.170 But the court also recog-
nized the value of reference guides and that the defendant was not un-
reasonable in relying on a fair use defense.171 Accordingly, the court 
awarded the minimum statutory damages per work.172 Likewise, in 
Doehrer v. Caldwell, in 1980, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois awarded minimum statutory damages against a politi-
cian who used a cartoonist’s work in his campaign mailings.173 
 Other courts do a poor job of accommodating First Amendment 
interests when awarding statutory damages. In Los Angeles Times v. Free 
Republic, in 2000, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia awarded statutory damages of $1 million against a nonprofit con-
servative website whose users posted full news articles from the Washing-
ton Post and the Los Angeles Times in an attempt to show liberal media 
bias.174 Free Republic plainly had a First Amendment interest in using 
the newspaper articles to make its argument. The court ultimately de-
nied the fair use defense, but the imposition of such extreme statutory 
damages serves to overly chill speech serving undeniable First Amend-
ment interests.175 Even if the website took too much and was too aggres-
sive in its invocation of fair use, large statutory damage awards such as 
these serve to chill speech that is in the grey zone, or even on the mar-
gin of the grey zone, between infringing and fair uses. Because the pub-
                                                                                                                      
169 See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). I very briefly represented Steven Vander Ark, the author of the Harry Potter Lexi-
con at issue in this suit, in a matter collateral to this litigation. I emphasize that the views 
expressed here are entirely my own. 
170 Id. at 544, 547. 
171 Id. at 545. 
172 Id. at 554 (awarding $750 for each of the seven instances of infringing use, for a to-
tal of $6,750). 
173 207 U.S.P.Q. 391, 394 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (awarding $250 in damages). 
174 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1862, 1864 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
175 See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1455–65, 1473 (C.D. Cal. 2000) 
(granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to fair use). 
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lic has a First Amendment interest in hearing such speech, which must 
be balanced against the incentive effect of copyright law, the overly pu-
nitive application of statutory damage awards fails to adequately ac-
commodate First Amendment interests. Courts should avoid the consti-
tutional question as to whether damage awards such as this one are 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment by using their discretion 
to award more minimal statutory damages when a significant speech 
interest is in the balance against the copyright owner’s interest.176 
Conclusion 
 Judges should keep First Amendment interests in the forefront of 
their minds in deciding copyright cases in the modern, non-traditional 
copyright world. A number of accommodations of First Amendment 
interests likely need to be made in specific cases. This Article has sug-
gested several such First Amendment accommodations that courts 
might make in individual copyright cases. Courts should award low 
damages to copyright holders of orphan works or holders who have not 
otherwise given notice as to their ownership of a copyright pre-
infringement. Additionally, courts could grant broader fair use rights as 
copyrighted works age. When it comes to works eligible for statutory 
damages, courts should balance any First Amendment interest in the 
use made of a copyrighted work, and any reasonable arguments regard-
ing non-infringement or fair use, against the copyright holder’s interest 
in receiving a large statutory award. In cases where the First Amend-
ment interest in using the work is high, or where non-infringement or 
fair use arguments are strong, courts should award damage amounts 
closer to actual damages or the minimum statutory amount. Courts 
should seriously consider the accommodations discussed in this Article, 
and be open to other accommodations to copyright law in order to re-
store the balance between the public’s First Amendment interests in 
using and listening to speech found in copyright-eligible work and the 
incentive function of copyright. It is only by restoring this balance that 
the constitutional interests protected by both the First Amendment and 
the Copyright Clause can by fully realized. 
                                                                                                                      
176 The case ultimately settled for $10,000. See Arthur Bright, Citizen Media Law Project, 
LA Times v. New Republic, http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/la-times-v-free-republic (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2009). 
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